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In whatever time frame， nothing is more risky than trying to predict 
th巴courseof China's explorations in its period of transition. One cannot 
even claim that a short-term prediction can be easier or more accurate 
than a long-term one. However， ifwe must engage in certain forms of 
pr，巴dictionhere， we shall have to base our argum芭nts on ra tionalistic 
inference concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the present policies 
of system reform and the possible scope of change. A perennial basic 
problem in predicting the development of Chinese politics is how to 
assess the stability and continuity of the existing conditions. Not only 
foreign scholars， but the Chinese themselves have often not been able to 
foresee the probability of the occurrence of totally unexpected abrupt 
changes and dramatic reversals in the immediate future. Thus， in such a 
political context in China， the time span covered by one's prediction seems 
not to be the most crucial point. 
In April 1985， Deng Xiaoping stated that“in 3 or 5 years， the 
success or failur，巴 ofreform can be judged."(l) According to his other 
remarks， itseems that th巴 partyleadership believes that the next 2 or 
3 years will be a crucial period which will decide the success or failure 
of China's new experiment. If we consider this time span a so-called 
crossroads or watershed in the modernization line， then their perception 
is not much different from ours. Yet， the prospects for the period beyond 
this remain unclear. Generally speaking， the problems facing the ruling 
elite in China consist of how to control， regulate and integrate the 
frictions and conflicts between the various social and economic motive 
forces liberated by the present reform policies， or which exploded therefrom， 
and individual or collective interests， and those between reformist factions 
and conservative factions or factions defending their vested interests inside 
the party and the government; how to link r，号formof the economic 
system to the achievement of proper economic growth; how to overhall 
the leadership system of the party; how to achieve an appropriate degree 
of deconcentration of power in the existing system of over椅concentration
of power in politics and in public administration; and how to put forth 
a vision of socialism that wi1l be accepted as a new integrative myth. 
This should be understood as being equivalent to reexamining whether 
the socialist system in China can maintain its true governing capability 
in the五nalstage of the Deng Xiaoping era. Furthermore. despite the 
many di缶cultproblems they are continuous facing， the present party 
leadership probably cannot afford to“fail". This is becausεnot only will 
a drastic reversal of policies resu1ting from setbacks giv邑 riseto tragic 
confusion， the deluge of th巴 logicof “commodity economy"京ril1巴adto 
the metamorphosis of the system. In th巴 followingparagrapbs，サeshall 
summarize the various points which form the basis of our forecast of 
the Chinesese political situation. 
Achievements and the Germination of New Conflicts 
Th巴 accomplishmentsof economic policies in the past 7 y巴a1'shave 
been remarkable. Their social spread effects continue to produce a great 
motive force for change and clevelopment in Chinese society. The quiet 
revolution of yearning for a consumer-oriented society has become more 
and more apparent among the masses. For a long time to come， eveI). 
if industrialization proceeds steadily China will remain a soci号tyvlherein 
peasants constitute the overwhelming mayority of the population. With 
the1atent revival of the peasants' traditional mentality of private ovvnership 
of land， the desire to get rich， the enterpreneur mentality， tl沼田pansion
of the scope of economic activities and with them， the influx of information 
from the cities， the rural society is today being rapidly swepe by the 
wave of .modernization. The changes in the sense of value and attitude 
of urban laborers and service personnel is a180 notable. 1t is more than 
clear that as a whole， Chinese society has been moving toward the 
direction of de・ideologization. However， the other side of economic 
achievements is the fact that the modernization policy itself， or this， 
together with the introduction of market町 onomy，has given rise to 
various new conflicts within the soci巴ty. The Chinese society will have 
to grapple with di伍cultproblems invariably shared by other modernizing 
societies for a long time to come. China， with its socialist system at an 
immature stage of institutionalization， will not probably be able to remain 
immune from the instability and multip1e conflicts experienced by many 
transtional societies. The Chinese leadership is confronted with an entirely 
new social and economic situation bringing forth numerous complicated 







Certain new phenomena of utmost significance in the vein of control 
and integration of the socialist system during a period of transition include 
the so-called “decentralization" of power， a product of revamping 
the system of over-concentration of power， and the emergence of a 
relatively pluralistic tendency and the diversification of interests in society. 
The expansion of decision-making power of ent怠rprisesin the industrial and 
commercial sectors， various forms of economic responsibility systems， worker 
participation in enterprise management， various types of enterprises， 
economic activities and management methods， economic association between 
enterprises， and the formation of regional economic zones on the one 
hand， together with the encouragement of “socialist competition" on the 
oth巴r，continue to give rise to countless relatively independent and diver-
sified economic units. Apparently， the expansion and diversi五cationof 
the scope of “instructional" plans which are outside the jurisdiction of the 
so-called “mandatory" plans continues to give rise to an explosion of di剛
versified collective interests. In place of the past stagnation seen in 
egalitarianism， the inequality brought about by the prosperity of some 
peas叩 tsand the income gap among urban residents according to their 
occupation would probably. give rise to new splits and conflicts between 
various social strata. Moreover， the granting of rights to cities， provinces， 
departments and enterprises to deal directly in foreign trade and the 
setting up of special economic zones and economic development zones 
as part of the economic policy of opening up to foreign countries would 
also give rise to claims for those areas' and unts' particular and special 
interests. Apart from th巴se，the growing threat to the sense of social 
security as a result of the application of the principle of competition; the 
increase in economic crimes and the回 posureof the corruption of party 
and state cadres; the increasing pressure of inflation; the possibility of 
closure of certain enterprises and unemployment; the demand for expanding 
the scale of collecting progressive income tax; the revision of various 
policies on subsidies in order to relieve the financial deficit; and lastly， 
the setting up of a new rational price system which requires utmost 
prudence， are al thorny issues. The reform of the economic system， as 
we shall discuss in more detail later on， islinked to the reform of 
th巴 politicalsystem. Pursuing economic and political reforms side by side 
complicates and aggravates the problem of social engineering in a 
transitional society. 
The present party leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping has been able 
to restore the damaged authority of the party to a considerable degree 
by virtue of the achievements of the reform of the economic system. 
Using the reform line as a basis of legitimizatiom， they seem to be determined 
to hurdle 'what伺 nbe cal1ed a critical stage of reform which they 
are confronting at present. However， the new situation described above 
coIltinues to accumulate new dis∞ntent and conflicts， asenumerated above， 
at the individual， col1ectIve， regional and other levels. Moreover， atthis 
very point in time， the party leadership needs to take ∞ the task of 
transforming the p印plefrom mere beneficiaries of the modernization 
policies into a 戸ople∞ni.mittedto bearing the unavoidable social and 
economic costs of the next stage of system reform. Yet， compelIing the 
people to make sacrifice may∞me against the wal1 of the self・consciousness
of an awakened people' and their wil1 to protect their vested interests. 
This may even become detrimental to the credibility of the party 
leadership am∞g the masses which the CCP has worked so hard to 
establish. A high tempo of promotion of reforms， followed by immediate 
shift to a new policy dimension-this pattern of the CCP's policy process 
has often been observed even in the past. At this point， the ability of 
the intent of the Party Center and the State Council to penetrate the 
lower levels of the system wil1 again be put to test. 
“Stability and Unity" and the Demand for a Flexible 
Deconeentrated Power Strueture 
Among the inherent fatal problems in the reform and invigorization 
of the socialist system are the fact that the mechanism for inducing 
active plura1istic motive forces from below is very much limited， and 
that the四 motiveforces themselves， once released from the masses， easily 
∞me into conflict with the centralized system of one-party rule. The 
party must continue to induce the motive force for development while 
working to secure the needed commitment of the masses to its goals 
by convincing them of the rationality and effectiveness of the initiative 
from above. The strategy upheld by the present leadership consists of 
str.iving to attain their foremost aim of maintaining political integration 
or“stabi1ty and unity" by expanding the scope of administrative de∞n-
centration on the one hand， and searching for flexible and concessionary 
methods of regulating conflicting interests， inc1uding non・institutional
ones， to supplement the immature adjustment mechanism of the system 
on the other， atthe same time encouraging very limited interest arti∞lation 
at the basic level of political institutions. 1n this， the Party Center needs 
to continue to search for the “optimal point" of compromise within the 
framework of the modernization line while coping with the conflicting 
demands of such goals as reform， efficiency， giving emphasis to the motive 
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force for development， suppressing deviations and protecting vested int号rests.
As we al know， even in th巴 areaof political and administrative 
system， certain forms of pluralization and partial deconcentration to the 
localities in policy making are gradually taking place even as the hitherto 
basic frame丸!vorkof centralism is being maintained. Examples of this are 
the strengthening of the functions of the people's congresses system and 
the enhancement of the role of local governments. The professionalization 
of the members of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress and their freedom to speak out and vote may become substantially 
more significant in the future. The granting of legislative power to 
local people's congresses on local laws-although some aspects of this 
remain ambigious-is surely significant even if only symbolically. A most 
typical manifestation of the conflict of int官民stsbetween th巴 central and 
local authorities is the question of allocation of financial resources among 
various provincial and municipal governments by thεState Council and 
the problem of suppressing the desi.re to expand the scale of basic 
construction for the purpos告 ofincreasing local 五nancial incomε(2) 
Prob丘bly，such conflict of int己restsbetweεn the central and local authorities 
has existed ali along ever since th巴 foundingof the People's Republic. 
Yet， itseems that during this period of system reform， with the central 
gov巴rnmentactively seeking the ful play of local initiative and vitality， 
such confiict h邑sbecome mor己 manifestdue to the active articulation 
of regional interests from below and th巴 demandfor support of vested 
interests of the cities and regions. Th邑 generalpolitical backdrop sustaining 
this tendency is the relative decline of the Party Center's authority and 
the conciii旦t01"yapproach of the“Center" to local politics， giving top 
priority to maintaining九tabiiityand unityヘonthe one hand，丘ndthe 
growing se!f-assertion of the “localities" on thεother. F臼rtherlnorε，an-
othe1' basis of this seif-assertion of th告“localities"is the increasing say 
the local peopl号、 congresseshave on matters of local policy.making and 
policy -im plemen ta tion. 
Turning to the question of delegating administrative and ent号rpris己
managerial powers to local authorities and the Iower levels， it8eems that 
tぬhiおsma可3ア se町r'i"咋号 aおs自anenc∞ourag'伊ementof dおem旦如ndstωo further 巴郎xpμan吋1dthe 二
d仇枇e伐cωO∞nト叩伽
五fir悶 ncia心1tωo personnel ma討t旬er路S. II1 this mannerョ theresults of reform of 主
the economic sァstem予vi!lprobably inten8ify their ramifications and linkage 
ef，巴ctsin the society as a whole. This kind of situation may be an 
inevitable result of the change from a policy of politics first， or“politics 
takes command" to on号 ofeconomics五r8t. 1n the process of grappling 
with various pressures， the Chinese political and administrative system 
may gradually become more flexible. Even if centralism is stil1 retained 
as a basic principle of the system， in actual practice， the dispersion of 
power may yet become an inherent part of the system. However， one 
question remains. 1t is stil1 unclear whether the increasing flexibility of 
the centralized sys総m wi1 ultimately come about through a conscious， 
premeditated and controlled process， or that despite desperate efforts to 
preserve centralism， a centralized system with feeble cohesive power is 
nonetheless brought forth as a result of the growth of certain practically 
un∞ntrollable components of the system. 
The multiple conflicts of int怠restsbrought forth in the Chinese society 
1n transition described above may be too enormous in scale and too 
.complicated to resolve within the existing centralized political and administ-
rative system through its so.ca11ed bureaucratic politics. No doubt， the 
administrative ability of China's present administrative organs is not enough 
to deal effectively with the new situation. While it appears that in 
today's Chinese society， the concept of “interests" is becoming prominent 
{)ver the former value of self.saαifice， the question of how to regulate 
and integrate the de facto pluralistic collective interests in a society 
where the westem concept of “interest groups" is proscribed represents a 
basic problem to the cCP，s leadership as it is to a11 socialist systems in 
the midst of the process of evolution and change in the present world. 
1t is a well known fact that during the early period of the post.Mao 
-era， the themes of “modernization" cover only industry， agriculture， science 
and technolology， and defense. Even in the Third Plenum of the 11th 
Central Committee of 1978， although “the reform of production relad∞ships 
and various aspects of the superstructure" and “the reform of managerial 
methods， behavioral patterns ilnd ways of thinking" were mentioned， the 
CCP did not necessarily have a c1ear blueprint of an integrated modern 
revolution.(3) However， from late 1980， the viewpoint of “comprehensive 
modernization" was advanced and the need for “long term plan， the for-
mulation of guidance work， the intensification of research on problems in 
science technology， engineering， economics， politics， law， management， 
手 educationand so forth， and the definition of their interrelationships叩 3
2 回meto be stressed. In April 1983， an article by Yu Haocheng c1aimed 
云 that，“Withoutdemocracy， there can be no socialism， and without political 
~ democratization， there伺 nbenoe∞nomicmodernization.川町 From this 
period， articles by Chinese scholars often ∞ntain serious analysis of past 
shortcomings of the centralized system in both the political and economic 
aspects. There have been continuous efforts to search for a new model 
of socialist construction based on an introsp己ctionon such shortcomings. 
However， while in the realm of the economic system， reform stil 
remains program， or perhaps merely the economic philosophy， bold 
models have been put forth for discussion. On the contrary， in the realm 
of the political and administrative system， the concept of reform has been 
limited and the tempo of development of the concept has been sIow. In 
the past few years， although many Chinese theoreticians have shown in-
terests in the regulatory function of the state， there has been 110 in-depth 
discussion on the macro political and administrative framework for 
interest regulation. Most probably， there will not be any systematization 
and institutionalization of new thinking on regulatory mechanisms for 
the new period in the near future. As pointed out by Tan Jian， in 
China， public administration has been the most neglected field of study. 
Thus， it can be said that the th告oreticalfoundation for administrative 
reform is also weak.(6) On the other hand， efforts to change the 
people's traditional behavioral pattern of passive reaction to politics， an 
intrinsic aspect of Chinese political culture， and the learning process to 
acquire mature skills to regulate interests in public affairs will take a 
long time. It must be pointed out that this also constitute an objective 
factor restraining the comprehensive reform of the Chinese sysほm.
The Party Center's Authority and th母 CCPLead記rship
at the Crossroads 
In the past few years， personnel changes have gradually been irnplemented 
in the Party Center， local party organizations and gov百rnmentagencies. 
The basic trend is that of rejuvenation， inteI1ectuaIization and professionali-
zationー thatis， technocratic type of cadres ar巴onthe rise. That leaders of 
Deng Xiaoping's generation will r巴treatfrom the political scene is nearly 
for certain in the next few years. A certain technocratiと t邑ndency，for 
sure， means the decline of the elements of “rule of man" under the 
so-called g，巴rontocrary. On the other hand， itmay also lead to the multiplト
cation of pressures 011 questions of collective interests旦ndpolicy choices 
from different directions and through a greater number of cI1annels. As to 
the intensity of the pressure from above for system reform， itrnay be そこ
even more difficult for the younger leader泊ipil1 the future to eliminate 竿
the resIstance tωO由 c凶
in the traditional cadr問.官esy戸st匂em. Thus， whereas the gradual rejuvenation ~ 
of the Party Center rnay be understood as an element favorable for 
promoting modernization， itmay not nec巴ssarilyhave a decisive influence 
on enhancing the breakdown of th巴 party'sbureaucratic nature and institu-
tionalized priveleges and the functional differentiation of party， government 
and enterprises. 
Concerning the actual condition of the progress of party rectification 
work， despite efforts in the past few years， the situation does not seem to 
warrant optimism. Granting that a time lag is inevitable in the tempo 
of party recti五cationwork in each region， itis stil apparent that the 
momentum of party rectification work itself is generally on the decline， 
and that differences in the degree of compliance of various localities have 
come into the open. Non-party personages stil echoe the doubt expressed 
by Bo Yibo as late as Oecember 1984 that“whether in the end， the 
CCP's work style can be basically improved.川7) Inside the party， there 
remains a view that stereotyped， familiar expressions of criticism are merely 
being repeated ad infinitum. While on the one hand， the improvement 
of the party's organizational quality is a requirement for the moderniation 
policy， there is also the dilemma of the need to protect the “legitimate" 
rights of party cadres-the basis for the party leadership's existence-and 
the security of their political life. The reaction of middle level cadres to 
pressure from abov巴 forimproving the party's organizational quality will 
be critical for the CCP and the fate of system reform. 
As should be obvious from the above discussion， the momentum of 
the comprehensive system reform sinc巴 1980is gradually coming to the 
crossroads. In terms of the problem of control and integration in a 
transitional society， the fact that the party le旦dershipis caught in a 
situation of antimonies and trade-off relationships， and that the leadership 
function of the party is continuously b巴ingrestrained by party politics 
itself and the social environment surrounding the party do not augur well 
for reform. Basic level party cadres are the ones feeling the threat to 
the maintenanc巴 oftheir authority as a result of system reform. As 
exemplified by the restriction on the duties of factory party committees 
with the establishment of the factory manager responsibility system by 
the“Oecision on Reform of the Economic System"， one of the main 
themes of reform of the political system is to r己ducethe areas covered 
by the party's controlling function. Although theoretically， the fact that 
子 technocrats with enterpreneurial abilities are holding real powers in 
~ managing factories cont山側 toefl五cie町， in cases where the co仰 ωition
穴 ofthe ente叩rise'sparty committee is not exactly technocratic， then the 
~ role of the party committee becomes secondary. At the sam巴 time，as 
ideological and political work continues to lose its meaning， party committees 
inevitably feel the threat to their raison d'etre. In the case of government 
organs， when the powers of various ranks in the administrative setup 
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become well-defined with the strengthening of the post responsibility system， 
the relationship between these powers and the leadership powers of party 
committees will probably produce very complicated tensions. As the principle 
of separation of party and government and of party and enterprises was 
brought forth with the revamp of the past system of over-concentration 
of power in mind， the harmonization of this principle with the CCP's 
organizational theories taking the stand of the Soviet-style system of 
placing p釘 tycadres in government organs wi1l be a problem to be 
tackled in the future， since this is a question implying revolutionary 
changes in China's one-party system. On the other hand， with the spread 
of the production responsibility system in the countryside， the leading 
role of rural party cadres has also diminished. The weakening of faith 
in the “Centerγpolicies is perhaps another serious problem for the 
Party Center in its efforts to control the enormous rural society. 
Furthermore， asmentioned previously， the CCP is not ready with a proper 
method to regulate and integrate the newly erupted pluralistic collective 
interests. The CCP's response is rather based on traditional theory and 
style. 1t consists not of cultivating a regulatory mechanism from below 
based on the creativity of the various social units， but of relying on a 
custom of framework-setting from above and on a certain form of 
moralism. That is， by reemphasizing the concept of “Quanguo Yipanqi" 
(taking the whole country as one chessboard and conducting comprehensive 
c∞'rdination of the movements)，<8) the CCP demands a∞rrect understand-
ing of the relationship between the part and the whole， organizational 
devotion， discip1ine and party members' morality. Such a response either 
sthows a blind overconfidence on the part of the CCP regarding social 
control which has long been part and parcel of the monopolistic leadership of 
the party or demonstrates the paucity of its imagination. 1n connection 
with the reform of the political sy脚 m，the CCP is preaching the need for 
“rule of law". Here， the CCp's approach is rather political campaign-
oriented， orit paradoxically reveals the reassertion of the concept of “rule 
of man". In any case， a deficiency in systems theory viewpoints is 
evident. The present Chines告 theoreticianshave no idea of the importance 
of an institutional intermediary entity regulating the relationship between 
power and the p郎ple，between the central and local authorities， and 
betw偲nthe center and various departments. 1n China， since in reality， 
vertical relationships of compliance are the norm， a vicious circle of the 
gap in the responses between powerholders and the people， and between 
upper and lower levels-as the saying goes，“you have your policies; 1 
have my countermeasures"-latently exists which makes true political 
integration di伍cultto achieve. 
Limited Options 
The final point to be偲 aminedin forecasting the future of Chinese 
politics pertains to the question whether the left-right swing of the 
pendulum of the p釘ty'sline and policy has basically stopped， or if it 
hぉ not，whether the range of its swing has shown a tendency of 
becoming n訂rower. Since it is a fact that pendulum swings stil occur 
in connection with the overcoming of obstacles or dilemmas， in the 
future， certain reversals to centralism and other revisions of the line such 
as re-emphasis on ideological orientation in ideological and political work 
may stil oc∞r. However， itmust be noted that in the case of certain 
ぉpectsof the party line and policy， arbitrariness stil persists in the 
local authorities' interpretation and implementation. Not only have perfunc-
toriness and limitedness in ∞mpliance not been overcome， this phenomenon 
S即msto be growing in s∞lpe. Therefore， even if pendulum swings in 
policy reappear， itis rather expect邑dthat thir effects will become more and 
more devoid of substance. Actually， the options available to the party 
leadership are fairly limited. As evident in the criticism of “spiritual 
pollution" in late 1983 and the repressive reaction to the demands for 
“democratization" in early 1987， even if certain confusions and crises 
occur as a result of the conflicts and uncertainties characteristic of societies 
in transition， there is very litle possibility that the Party Center which 
inherits the present line will be ready to return to the “leftist" line. 
The negation of vested interests such as the economic responsibility 
system may give rise to confusion which may， in turn， lead to the 
∞Uapse of the incumbent leader百hip. The modernization policy in the past 
10 years has created a firmly-rooted social and economic framework which 
serves as an objective restraining force to the p釘ty'spolicy options. 
Therefore， even if radical changes occur in the ∞mposition of the party 
leadership， rational supposition tels us that the leading group cannot 
afford to effect basic revisions in the current modernization line. Also， 
the probability of a military dictatorship stil remains very remote. And 
if a situation necessitating such a dictatorship d伺 iSappear， then it simply 
means the “breakdown of modernization" in China. lnternational relations 
also serve as a delimiting factor to the po鉛iblescope of change. Even if 
troubles in Sino-Japanese relations flare up unexpectedly， itis nearly 
impossible for whatever regime in China to change the basic framework 
of present international relations in Asia. 
The most probable course of development is for the party leadership 
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to exert utmost effort to form a relatively conciliatory balance of forces， 
minimizing as much as possible the differences in opinions and policies 
within the leadership which will inevitably intensify at a critical stage 
of the modernization policy， while it r巴gularlyengages in minor adjustments 
of the present reform line. As a r巴su1t，we may witness the gradual 
emergence of a relatively flexible but loos巴oligarchyembodying bur田 ucratic
or limited pluralism at al levels of the po1itical system. This not only 
means that the Party Center and central government in China wil1 not 
be dictatorial， but a1so that China's future may not necessarily approximate 
the Soviet Union befor巴 Gorbachovpolitically and organizationally.(9) 
Whether in ov巴rcomingthe di伍cultiesof the transition period the party 
leadership opts to minimize frictions and conflicts or to give priority 
to growth and reform is a choice for the policy-makers of the time 
to make. 日Ovvアever，the dynamics of real politics se官msto betray the 
assertion of the reformers that reform should be promoted with “drastic 
measuresぺ(10) The political outcome of student actions demanding democ-
ratization in various cities of China in December 1986 seems to support 
my prediction here. 
??????
NOTES 
( 1) At a meeting of Deng Xiaoping with the vice president of Tanzania， 
“Reform is Everybody's Idea and the People's Demand"， Renmin Ribao， 
April 16， 1985. Other remarks can be found in Deng's talks with the 
prime minist記rof Turkey， RMRB， July 3， 1985 and his talks with the 
Algerian party delegation， RMRB， June 30， 1985. 
(2) For exampl巴唖 this was discussed in the editorial of RMRB on J uly 8， 
1983，“Unify our Thinking， Keep in Step". 
( 3 ) A typical example of articles limiting the concept of“modernization" to 
the realm of industry in its discussion is Huan Xiang's“On the Problems 
of SociaJist Modernization in China"， Zhexue Yanjiu， October 1979. 
( 4) Xue Baodinふ“AnAnalysis of Modernization as an Integrated Whole"， 
Hongqi， no. 24， 1980， p.， 18. 
(5) Yu Haocheng，“Reform of the Political system and the Promotion of 
Socialist Democracy"， in How to Understand and Practice “Building 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics"， Guangming Ribao Chubanshe， 
September 1984， p.11. Originally published in Guangming Ribao， April 
25， 1983. 
( 6) For details， see Tan Jian，“On the Goals of Administrative Reform九
in Tan Jian，ξd.， Articles on Problems of Reforming Government Organs 
and the Cadre System， Renmin Chubanshe， June 1984. 
( 7) “Party Recti五cationWork in the Past Year-Excerpts of Comrade Bo 
Yibo's Speech in the December 21 Forum"， RMRB， December 23， 1984. 
( 8) This term was originally used by Ke Qingshi in February 1959. 1ts 
meaning has been changed and from around 1982 began to appear in 
Renmin Ribao and in Zhao Ziyang's speeches. However， indocument 
for internal circulation and local party organs， ithas appeared occasionally 
since late 1979. 
(9) Jurgen Domes takes such position as“the political and organizational 
present of the Soviet Union may well be the future of the PRC". 
However， itseems too simplistic to predict the emergence of a Soviet 
type of polity in the future when assessing the immaturity and di銭culty
of institutionalization in China and the unpredictability of the impact of 
reform of the economic system. (See Jurgen Domes， The Go旬'ernment
and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition， Westview Press， 1985， 
p. 253.) Several American scholars have also raised questions concerning 
the ability of the intent of central authorities to penetrate lower levels 
in China， the impact of system reform on party cadres and the weakening 
of the central government's governing power on the localities. See e. 
g.， Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong， eds.. The Political Economy 
of Reform in Post-Mao αina， Harvard University Press，羽田.
(10) Thematic Research Group on Comparative Economic Systems， Institute 
of Economics. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (headed by Liu Guo・
guang)，“On the Problem of Models in the Goals of Reform of the 
Economic System in Our Country九ZhongguoShehui Kexue， no.5， 1984， 
p.44. 
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